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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
In this consolidated appeal, Erica Lee Alcala appeals from the district 
court's orders revoking her probation and executing the sentence previously 
imposed upon her guilty plea to battery on a law enforcement officer, and from 
the sentence imposed upon her guilty plea to felony driving under the influence. 
She also challenges the Idaho Supreme Court's order denying her motion to 
augment the record with transcripts from previous probation violation and 
jurisdictional review hearings. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In October 2003, Cassia County law enforcement officers were dispatched 
to a residence in response to a trespassing complaint. (11/30/04 PSI, p.2.) 
There, they observed Alcala and two men in the yard of the residence. (Id.) 
Alcala was slow and sluggish in her movements, stumbled as she walked, and 
slurred her words. (Id.) When the officers ordered her to stop, Alcala tried to 
enter the residence. (Id.) Alcala then physically resisted the officers' attempt to 
arrest her for trespassing. (Id.) Once arrested, Alcala continued to resist, and 
kicked one of the officers in the upper thigh. (Id.) 
The state charged Alcala with battery on a law enforcement o'fficer, illegal 
consumption of alcohol, disturbing the peace, trespassing, and resisting and 
obstructing a police officer. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.51-52; 11/30/04 PSI, p.5.) 
Alcala failed to appear at the jury trial, and was arrested on a bench warrant 
several weeks later. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.121, 128-130.) Alcala then pied guilty 
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to battery on a law enforcement officer, and the state agreed to dismiss the 
associated misdemeanor charges. (6/24/04 Tr., p.4, L.23 - p.12, L.20.) 
Sentencing was delayed for several months after Alcala failed to appear at both 
her presentence investigation appointment and the sentencing hearing. (#38882 
R., Vol. I, pp.144-158.) Finally, in December 2004, the district court entered a 
unified four-year sentence with 18 months fixed, but suspended the sentence 
and placed Alcala on probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.173-180.) 
The state filed its first report of probation violation in September 2005. 
(#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.186-189.) The state alleged that Alcala failed to make 
ordered restitution payments, failed to report to ordered anger management 
treatment, failed to obtain a substance abuse evaluation, tested positive for 
cocaine use, admitted using methamphetamine, failed to maintain employment, 
and failed to appear for scheduled supervision appointments. (Id.) Alcala failed 
to appear for a probation violation hearing, and the district court issued a bench 
warrant. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.203-211.) After she was taken back into custody, 
Alcala admitted violating her probation. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.232-235.) The 
district court revoked probation and executed the originally imposed sentence, 
but retained jurisdiction. (Id.) At the conclusion of the period of retained 
jurisdiction, the district court suspended the remainder of Alcala's sentence and 
placed her back on probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. I, pp.238, 240-
244.) 
The state filed its second report of probation violation in January 2007. 
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.246-249.) The state alleged that Alcala changed her 
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residence without permission, failed to report in writing to her probation officer as 
required, failed to seek or maintain full time employment, failed to pay required 
supeNision fees, failed to complete an ordered cognitive self-change treatment 
program, failed to complete ordered community supeNision, absconded from 
probation, failed to pay required incarceration fees, and failed to make required 
restitution payments. (Id.) Alcala was not taken into custody until approximately 
10 months later, in November 2007. (#38882 R., Vol. II, p.258.) Alcala then 
admitted violating her probation. (#38882 R., Vol. II, p.265.) In January 2008, 
the district court re-imposed the original sentence but placed Alcala back on 
probation for three years. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.270-275.) 
In January 2009, Alcala was arrested and charged with misdemeanor 
driving under the influence and failing to provide a valid driver's license. (#38882 
R., Vol. II, pp.287-289; 2/22/11 PSI, p.7.) The state subsequently filed a third 
report of probation violation in Alcala's battery on a law enforcement officer case. 
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.282-284.) The state alleged Alcala committed the new 
DUI and driver's license offenses, failed to pay supeNision fees, consumed 
alcohol, refused a breath test after the DUI arrest, and was discharged from 
ordered moral reconation therapy as a result of the DUI charge. (Id.) Alcala pied 
guilty to the DUI and admitted violating her probation. (2/22/11 PSI, p. 7; #38882 
R., Vol. II, pp.300-301.) The district court revoked Alcala's probation, executed 
the originally imposed sentence, but retained jurisdiction for a second time. 
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.320-323.) In October 2009, at the conclusion of the 
second period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended the remainder 
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of Alcala's sentence and again placed her back on probation for three years. 
(#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.332-340.) Nine days after being placed back on 
probation, Alcala served two days discretionary time for failing to stay at her 
reported residence. (#38882 R., Vol. II, p.341.) 
In May 2010, Alcala was arrested again and charged with felony DUI, 
driving on a suspended license, eluding a police officer, and obstructing and 
delaying a police officer. (#38883 R., pp.52-55.) The state subsequently filed a 
fourth report of probation violation in Alcala's battery on a law enforcement officer 
case. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.350-353.) The fourth report of violation referenced 
Alcala's new charges, and also alleged that Alcala failed to obtain and maintain 
employment, consumed alcohol, failed to pay supervision fees, refused a breath 
test after her DUI arrest, and was again discharged from ordered moral 
reconation therapy as a result of her new DUI charge. (Id.) Alcala admitted 
violating her probation. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.371-372; 9/14/10 Tr., p.58, L.10 -
p.60, L.10.) In September 2010, the district court agreed to release Alcala to the 
House of Ruth, an inpatient treatment facility. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.374-375; 
9/14/10 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.62, L.6.) The court continued Alcala's felony DUI 
proceedings and the disposition of the fourth probation violation until after 
Alcala's completion of or discharge from the treatment facility. (#38882 R., Vol. 
II, pp.374-375; 9/14/10 Tr., p.60, L.21 - p.63, L.24.) 
Ten days after being ordered into treatment, the House of Ruth director 
reported that Alcala had become intoxicated, refused a request to submit to a 
breath test, became combative, and fled the facility on foot. (#38882 R., Vol. II, 
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p.376.) The state then filed its fr~h report of probation violation in Alcala's battery 
on a law enforcement officer case. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.376-378.) The state 
alleged that Alcala consumed alcohol at the House of Ruth, and associated with 
an individual who was on probation or parole. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.376-378.) 
Before she could be taken into custody on the new probation violation, Alcala 
was arrested again and charged with possession of a controlled substance, and 
providing false information to a law enforcement officer. (2/22/11 PSI, pp.?, 9; 
#38882 R., Vol. II, p.386.) 
Alcala pied guilty to the felony DUI, and the state agreed to dismiss the 
associated misdemeanor charges. (#38883 R., p.119; 12/30/10 Tr., p.10, L.16-
p.24, L.23.) On the felony DUI, the district court entered a unified six-year 
sentence with two years fixed, to run concurrent with Alcala's other cases. 
(#38883 R., pp.103-106.) The district court also revoked probation on Alcala's 
battery on a law enforcement officer case, and reimposed the original four-year 
unified sentence with credit for 1,027 days served. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.403-
405.) Alcala timely appealed both her felony DUI sentence, and the district 
court's revocation of her probation on the battery on a law enforcement officer 
case. (#38882 R., Vol. II, pp.414-416; #38883 R., pp.121-123.) The Idaho 
Supreme Court consolidated these two appeals. (10/24/11 Order Granting 
Alcala's Motion to Consolidate Appeals.) 
After the appellate record was settled, Alcala requested and was granted 
a first extension of time to file her Appellant's brief. (11/1/11 Order Granting 
Extension of Time.) On December 5, 2011, the day Alcala's Appellant's brief 
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was due on 1st extension, she filed a motion to augment the record and to 
suspend the briefing schedule. (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof.") In this motion, Alcala 
requested six then-unprepared transcripts associated with previous probation 
violation and jurisdictional review hearings. (Id.) 
The Idaho Supreme Court initially granted Alcala's motion to augment. 
(12/22/11 "Order Granting Motion To Augment And To Suspend the Briefing 
Schedule.") However, the same day the Supreme Court entered its order, the 
state filed a partial objection to Alcala's motion. (12/22/11 "Objection in Part to 
'Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in 
Support Thereof."') The Idaho Supreme Court then withdrew its previous order 
and denied Alcala's motion to augment the record as to five of the six requested 
transcripts. (1/17/12 Order.) However, Cassia County still prepared each of the 
requested transcripts. (2/27/12 Motion to Reconsider, p.2, attachments.) Alcala 
attached these transcripts to her motion to reconsider the Idaho Supreme Court's 
order denying her motion to augment. (2/27/12 Motion to Reconsider, 
attachments.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Alcala's motion to reconsider. 
(3/29/12 Order.) Alcala subsequently filed her Appellant's brief. (See generally 
Appellant's brief.) 
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ISSUES 
Alcala states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Ms. Alcala due process 
and equal protection when it denied her access to the 
requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion, in docket number 
38883, when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, 
with two years fixed, upon Ms. Alcala, following her plea of 
guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol? 
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion, in docket number 
38882, when it revoked probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.7) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Alcala failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated her 
constitutional rights by denying her motion to augment the record with 
irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Alcala failed to show the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed a unified eight-year sentence, with two years fixed, upon her 
guilty plea to felony driving under the influence? 
3. Has Alcala failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by 
revoking her probation after her fifth probation violation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Alcala Has Failed To Establish That The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Her 
Constitutional Rights By Denying Her Motion To Augment The Appellate Record 
With Irrelevant Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
Alcala contends that by denying her motion to augment the appellate 
record with transcripts associated with prior probation violation and jurisdictional 
review hearings, the Idaho Supreme Court violated her constitutional rights to 
due process and equal protection and effectively denied her effective assistance 
of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.) Alcala has failed to establish 
a violation of her constitutional rights, however, because she has failed to show 
that the requested transcripts are even relevant to, much less necessary for 
resolution of, the issues Alcala raises on appeal. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Alcala Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The 
Requested Augmentations 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is 
sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the 
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proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 
(2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 
U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms and Paroles, 
357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, 
"will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or 
other items that ''will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 
372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an 
indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the trial record that are 
germane to consideration of the appeal" (internal citations omitted)); Lane, 372 
U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. 
To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, the defendant must show 
that any omissions from the record prejudiced her ability to pursue the appeal. 
State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) 
(distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See also 
United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice Alcala 
"must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were 
requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Alcala 
has failed to carry this burden. 
Alcala appeals only the district court's order revoking probation in her 
battery on a law enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882) and the district 
court's felony DUI sentence (Docket No. 38883). She has failed to adequately 
explain, much less demonstrate, how transcripts of hearings associated with prior 
probation violation and jurisdictional review hearings in the battery on a law 
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enforcement officer case are necessary to decide these issues. To the contrary, 
the record amply demonstrates that Alcala's motion to augment was properly 
denied because she failed to show that the transcripts she requested were 
necessary for adequate review of the district court's sentencing and probation 
violation disposition decisions. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), Alcala claims that 
she is only required to make a "colorable argument" that she needs "items" to 
complete a record before the burden transfers to the state "to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.13.) She 
also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that "to meet the constitutional 
mandates of due process and equal protection," the state must provide her (and 
all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record she desires unless the 
state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or 
frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.1 0; see also p.8 ("The only way a court can 
constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript 
is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) No 
reading of Mayer supports these legal arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and 
he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of 
prosecutorial misconduct. kl at 190. The appellate court denied his request for 
a trial transcript at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that 
verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings would be provided at government 
expense only for felonies. kl at 191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was 
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entitled to a record of his trial, but whether he was entitled to a verbatim 
transcript of his trial. kl at 193. The Court noted it addressed a similar issue in 
Draper, 372 U.S. 487, where the Court held that the government need not 
provide transcripts that were not "'germane to consideration of the appeal, and a 
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances."' Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96). 
However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary 
to assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the 
defendant with resources to pay his own way." ill at 195. "Moreover, where the 
grounds of appeal, as in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete 
transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript 
or an 'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds." ill 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must 
establish that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. ill at 
194. Only after the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is 
established and a colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant 
will the burden shift to the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some 
record other than a verbatim transcript will be adequate. ill at 194-95. See also 
Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether 
requested record necessary court should consider the "value of the transcript to 
the defendant in connection with the appeal," but standard does not require "a 
showing of need tailored to the facts of the particular case" and the court may 
take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
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In this case, Alcala contends that the Idaho Supreme Court erred by 
denying her motion to augment the record with the following transcripts: (1) the 
transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on December 7, 2007, following the 
state's second report of probation violation; (2) the transcript of the probation 
violation disposition hearing on January 8, 2008, following the state's second 
report of probation violation; (3) the transcript of the probation violation admission 
hearing held on March 10, 2009, following the state's third report of probation 
violation; (4) the transcript of the probation violation disposition hearing held on 
May 12, 2009, following the state's third report of probation violation; and (5) the 
transcript of Alcala's second jurisdictional review hearing held on October 21, 
2009. 1 (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and 
Statement in Support Thereof'.) However, Alcala has failed to show any of these 
transcripts were relevant to either the district court's decision to revoke probation 
or its sentencing determination. 
There is no evidence that the district court had the transcripts in question 
when it revoked Alcala's probation and sentenced her in March 2011. Because 
these transcripts were never presented to the district court in relation to those 
determinations, they were never part of the record before the district court and 
1 Alcala also requested that the record be augmented with the transcript of the 
admission hearing held on September 14, 2010, following the state's fourth 
report of probation violation. (12/5/11 "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof'.) Because Alcala's notice 
of appeal was timely as to the district court's decision to revoke probation after 
her fourth and fifth probation violations, the state did not object to this request, 
and the Idaho Supreme Court granted it. (12/22/11 "Objection in Part to 'Motion 
to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof'; 1/17/12 Order.) Thus, the 9/14/10 transcript is part of the appellate 
record. 
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are not properly considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 
124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a 
decision on the issues raised on appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review 
of the record made below" and "will not consider new evidence that was never 
before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 
985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to entertain new 
allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). 
There is also no evidence that the district court relied upon anything said 
at the prior hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke Alcala's probation and 
order her sentence executed, or in its sentencing determination. Alcala's mere 
assertion that the district court may have relied on its own recollection of 
statements made at the prior proceedings in later deciding whether to revoke her 
probation is pure speculation and fails to show that the requested transcripts are 
necessary to complete a record adequate for appellate review under the facts of 
this case. 
The state recognizes the Court of Appeals' statement in State v. 
Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), relied on by Alcala 
(Appellant's brief, p.15), that appellate "review [o'I] a sentence that is ordered into 
execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing when 
the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." There are, however, two reasons 
why Hanington does not support Alcala's claim of entitlement to the requested 
transcripts. 
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First, unlike Hanington, Alcala does not challenge the sentence that was 
ordered into execution following her period of probation in the battery on a law 
enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882).2 Instead, she argues only that the 
district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation (see Appellant's brief, 
pp.14-17), a decision that is capable of appellate review without resort to 
information bearing on the reasonableness of the sentence that was ultimately 
ordered into execution. 
Second, and more importantly, Hanington does not stand for the 
proposition that a merits-based review of a decision to revoke probation and 
order a sentence executed requires preparation and inclusion in the appellate 
record of transcripts of every hearing over which the trial court presided. To the 
contrary, the law is well established that, absent a showing that evidence was 
presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court relied on such evidence 
in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date 
probation was finally revoked. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 
(1971) (state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all 
2 Alcala also challenges the sentence imposed in her felony DUI case in Docket 
No. 38883. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-18.) However, while the district court 
properly referenced Alcala's criminal history and previous failures on community 
supervision in sentencing Alcala for felony DUI, it does not follow that Alcala is 
entitled to transcripts of probation violation and jurisdictional review hearings 
from separate criminal cases in her appeal of that sentence. There is no 
evidence that the court relied on anything said in those prior hearings in 
sentencing Alcala for felony DUI. Without such a nexus between prior probation 
hearings and sentencing hearings in separate cases, a state would be required 
to provide transcripts of a defendant's entire criminal proceeding history every 
time a district court referenced her prior record at sentencing. 
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of the stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal" (citation and internal quotations omitted)); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 
("[T]he fact that an appellant with funds may choose to waste his money by 
unnecessarily including in the record all of the transcripts does not mean that the 
State must waste its funds by providing what is unnecessary for adequate 
appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 477-78 
(indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was 
presented). 
Alcala also contends that she is entitled to the transcripts of previous 
probation violation hearings because the available minutes and judgments in the 
existing appellate record do not specify which probation violation allegations 
Alcala admitted to, and which were withdrawn or dismissed at those earlier 
hearings. (Appellant's brief, p.14.) In her motion to reconsider the Idaho 
Supreme Court's order denying her motion to augment the record, Alcala notes 
that the requested transcripts revealed that Aclala did not admit changing her 
residence without permission or actively avoiding supervision during her second 
probation violation admission hearing in December 2007, and did not admit to 
failing to pay required monthly supervision fees or refusing a BAG breath test 
during her third probation violation admission hearing in March 2009.3 (2/27/12 
Motion to Reconsider, pp.3-5.) Alcala, however, has not attempted to argue that 
3 The transcripts Alcala attached to her motion to reconsider also reveal that 
while she did not admit these four allegations, she did admit the other 10 
allegations across the second and third reports of probation violation. (2/27/12 
Motion to Reconsider, attachments.) 
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the district court considered this information several years later in revoking 
Alcala's probation after her fourth and fifth reports of probation violation, and in 
imposing sentence on her new felony DUI conviction. 
Although there may be some circumstances that require inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review the revocation of 
probation or even sentencing determinations in separate cases, Alcala has failed 
to show that any such circumstances apply here. It is Alcala's appellate burden 
to establish that the requested transcripts are necessary to create an adequate 
appellate record. The augmentations she sought, however, were of then-never 
before prepared transcripts of hearings held months, or even years, before the 
state filed its fourth and fifth reports of probation violation and charged Alcala 
with felony DU I. Alcala has failed to point to anything in the record that would 
indicate that statements made at these prior hearings were considered or played 
any role in the court's decisions in March 2011 to revoke Alcala's probation in the 
battery on a law enforcement officer case and to enter a unified eight-year 
sentence for the felony DUI conviction. 
As such, Alcala has failed to show that such transcripts are necessary to 
complete an adequate record on this appeal. Because all of the evidence before 
the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate 
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review, and Alcala has failed to establish a violation of her due process rights.4 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Further, Alcala's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court violated her due 
process rights lacks merit because Alcala was afforded the opportunity, prior to 
the settling of the appellate record, to designate not only the standard clerk's 
record, but also additional records necessary for inclusion in the clerk's record on 
appeal. I.AR. 28(a) and (c). Therefore, Alcala was provided the process by 
which she could designate all documents in the record she believed were 
necessary for appeal. While I.AR. 30 provides that a party may move the Idaho 
Supreme Court to add to the settled clerk's record, nothing therein creates a right 
to such augmentation. Alcala has failed to show that the ability to designate 
records for appellate review under I.AR. 28 was insufficient to afford due 
process in her case. 
Alcala has also failed to establish that denial of her request to augment 
the record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied her equal protection. 
Alcala cites to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate 
records because of their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.10-14 (citing,~. 
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); 
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963)).) However, there is nothing in the record 
4 As a component of her due process claim, Alcala argues that the denial of her 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived her of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-18.) 
Because, for the reasons already explained, Alcala has failed to show that the 
requested transcripts are necessary, or even relevant, for appellate review of the 
district court's order revoking her probation or its sentencing determination, there 
is no possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Alcala of 
effective assistance of counsel on this appeal. 
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that in any way indicates that the Idaho Supreme Court denied Alcala's request 
for transcripts solely because she is indigent. In fact, Alcala's motion to 
reconsider was denied even though the transcripts had already been prepared by 
Cassia County, and even though granting the motion to augment would thus 
have required no additional public expenditure. (See 2/27/12 Motion to 
Reconsider, p.2, attachments.) The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party 
seeking augmentation to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation 
requested. I.AR. 30. Alcala's motion to augment was denied because she failed 
to meet this minimal burden, imposed upon all parties, of showing that the 
transcripts were necessary or even helpful in addressing appellate issues. The 
Idaho Supreme Court's order properly denied the motion to augment because 
Alcala failed to make a showing that any appellant - indigent or otherwise -
would be entitled to augment the record as requested. 
Alcala has failed to show that the denial of her motion to augment was in 
any way influenced or decided by her indigence, nor has she demonstrated that 
the requested transcripts are necessary to complete a record adequate to review 
any issue she raised on appeal. To the contrary, the record amply demonstrates 
that Alcala's motion to augment was properly denied because she failed to show 
that the transcripts she requested were necessary for adequate review of the 
district court's decision to revoke her probation in the battery on a law 
enforcement officer case (Docket No. 38882), or the district court's sentencing 
determination in the felony DUI case (Docket No. 38883). Because Alcala has 
failed to show her due process or equal protection rights were implicated, much 
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less violated, by the denial of her motion to augment, she has failed to show any 
basis for relief. 
11. 
Alcala Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing 
Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Alcala asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed 
a unified sentence of eight years with two years fixed upon her guilty plea to 
felony driving under the influence. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-22.) Alcala has failed 
to establish an abuse of discretion, considering the objectives of sentencing, her 
extensive criminal history, and her failures complying in with community 
supervision. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. & 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant 
must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is 
excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To establish that the 
sentence is excessive, she must demonstrate that reasonable minds could not 
conclude the sentence was appropriate to accomplish the sentencing goals of 
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protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. ~ Idaho appellate 
courts presume that the fixed portion of a sentence will be the defendant's 
probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 896, 980 P.2d 
552, 560 (1999). 
In this case, the district court considered the appropriate sentencing 
factors. (3/29/11 Tr., p.40, Ls.5-12.) The court also ordered and considered a 
new presentence investigation report, substance abuse evaluation, and mental 
health evaluation. (12/30/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.2-7; 3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.43, 
L.16.) 
The district court referenced Alcala's prior criminal history, which is 
extensive. This was Alcala's fourth conviction for driving under the influence. 
(2/22/11 PSI, pp.3-7.) Alcala's criminal history also reflects numerous other 
alcohol and driving-related misdemeanor charges and convictions, as well as at 
least two convictions for obstructing and delaying police officers. (Id.) At the 
time of her sentencing on the felony DUI, Alcala was more than six years into an 
exceedingly unsuccessful probation for battery on a law enforcement officer. (Id.; 
see generally #38882 R., Vol. I, Vol. II; #38883 R.) 
The district court also expressed its concern with the facts of the felony 
DUI case. (3/29/11 Tr., p.42, Ls.12-18.) After the officer activated his 
emergency overhead lights, Alcala accelerated her vehicle down an alleyway, 
drove for several more blocks, pulled into a driveway, and then tried to flee the 
scene on foot. (#38883 R., p.18.) Alcala resisted and kicked at the officer who 
tried to arrest her, continuing a pattern of physical resistance against law 
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enforcement officers. (Id.) Alcala then refused the breathalyzer test. (Id.) A 
blood draw returned a BAC of .204. (2/22/11 PSI, p.2, attachments.) 
Alcala contends that the district court's sentence was excessive in light of 
mitigating factors she presented, including her childhood physical and emotional 
abuse, history of substance addiction, mental health issues, occasional success 
on probation in other cases, and willingness to accept treatment. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.19-22.) However, the district court did expressly consider these 
mitigating factors in its sentencing analysis. (3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.44, 
L.18.) The court also agreed to run Alcala's felony DUI sentence concurrently 
with her sentence for battery on a law enforcement officer following her probation 
revocation on the latter charge. (#38883 R., p.104.) 
After considering the facts of the case and applying the objectives of 
criminal punishment, the district court reasonably determined that imposing a 
unified eight-year sentence with two years fixed for Alcala's felony driving under 
the influence conviction was appropriate. Under any reasonable view of the 
facts, Alcala has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
111. 
Alcala Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Revoking Her Probation 
A. Introduction 
Alcala contends the district court abused its discretion in revoking her 
probation after her fourth and fifth reports of probation violation in light of her 
"newfound desire for treatment and willingness to adhere to treatment." 
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(Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) Alcala's argument does not establish an abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district 
court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion." 
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
C. The District Court Acted Within Its Discretion In Revoking Alcala's · 
Probation 
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and 
conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v. 
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams, 
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114 
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to 
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the 
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society. State v. 
Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122 
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327; Hass, 114 Idaho at 558, 758 P.2d at 717. 
The district court's decision to revoke Alcala's probation was primarily, and 
properly, based on Alcala's excessively poor performance on probation. (3/29/11 
Tr., p.44, L.19 - p.45, L. 10.) Alcala was originally arrested for battery on a law 
enforcement officer on October 20, 2003. (11/30/04 PSI, p.2.) As thoroughly 
discussed above, the next seven and a half years before the district court 
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revoked probation consisted of multiple failures to appear, probation violations, 
continued alcohol consumption, two new convictions for driving under the 
influence (the latter of which was a felony), and at least six other new 
misdemeanor convictions. (2/22/11 PSI, pp.3-7; see generally #38882 R., Vol. I, 
Vol. 11; #38883 R.) 
Alcala contends that the district court abused its discretion in light of the 
mitigating factors discµssed above in her excessive sentence argument, as well 
as her "newfound desire to obtain treatment." (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) 
However, the district court did consider the mitigating factors and Alcala's future 
rehabilitative prospects. (3/29/11 Tr., p.42, L.25 - p.44, L.18.) The fact that the 
district court did not revoke Alcala's probation until after the fourth and fifth 
reports of probation violation and after two periods of retained jurisdiction reflects 
the court's commitment to providing Alcala with every opportunity to succeed on 
community supervision. The district court stated: 
What I want to try to distinguish is dealing with the crime that 
you committed, which is a serious crime, and your treatment and 
recovery needs for the future so you can have a crime-free life, and 
that's the balancing part that's the most difficult thing I have to do. 
But as I look through and consider your age, your history, 
particularly the inability that you have even with all the treatment 
that's been offered and all the efforts that have been made by the 
state to lead you to treatment and to hope that the treatment is 
successful, in the end it's your decision, and you haven't chosen to 
make it successful. And maybe you will some day. I hope you do, 
because otherwise I'm afraid that the life you've had the last ten 
years is the life you are going to have for the next 40, and it's a 
dreadful life, and it's one that need not be, but in the end it's going 
to be your choice. 
So putting all those things together, I conclude you're not a 
candidate for probation at all and that at this point I don't see any 
purpose in having another retained jurisdiction program to consider 
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you for probation. I think that you can obtain treatment while in 
custody and would encourage you to seek out and participate in the 
therapeutic treatment community at your earliest option. 
(3/29/11 Tr., p.43, L. 17 - p.44, L. 18.) 
That Alcala believes the district court should have placed her on a third 
period of retained jurisdiction or reinstated her probation for a fourth time does 
not establish an abuse of discretion. This is particularly true where, as here, 
Alcala was given multiple opportunities to rehabilitate in the community, but 
continued to violate her probation. Because Alcala has failed to establish the 
district court abused its discretion in revoking her probation and ordering her 
sentence executed, she is not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order revoking Alcala's probation 
DATED this 26th day of June 2012 
MARK W. OLSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
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